The first alternative is bankruptcy States Collection without foundation, the other can lead to war
‘Who will pay’ (?), the situation in the shortest form in Euroland. We have not concealed anything in regard to this from the euro’s introduction. And we do not fear the Danish Law of Jante. It went, as we previously indicated it would.
The top in France who demanded DM Mark abolished and stopped the originally planned tough Euro to accept the reunification of Germany is now home to have the debt and deficits in France looked after – a strong Euro would have been impossible in Europe because it was bound to be the ruling-remedy of something too different.
The German state-debt amounted to 78.8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010, where the arbitrarily chosen politician-made limit in the Maastricht Treaty and further confirmed in the newly agreed EU’s stability – and growth pact is decided the highest 60 percent of GDP.
Without a strong real economy behind the euro it is no surprise that it’s exchange-rate should be down without someone to pay, defending currency speculation or euro as a Petro-Euro. It remains up. Why? New-mercantile currency floating in oil with Europe’s the real economy in stand still, does not seem as possible way to go1). We have not yet reached the deficits and losses on loans to the old Eastern Europe, several countries admitted as EU members. EU member countries thereby plus nation-states alone even in addition has secured quite-out-the-hemp-loan arrangements including housing loans in Eastern Europe with various banks as intermediaries.
Euro and its primary tasks: to assume that the common compulsory money unit should reflect the real economy of Europe and suit this, we have apparently misunderstood. Similar to Spain’s disastrous management of the gold experience in Latin America in 1500s, it seems that the euro at the best neo-mercantilist view via trade settled in euro, for example oil trade from the Middle East for much of the globe should form the generating momentum, causing the necessary change in Europe with more than 20% unemployed and excluded (officially 9% unemployment) and a huge and growing debt, of which it is almost impossible to draw an unambiguous picture anymore. Jean Monnet – one of the ancestors to the EU project – claimed precisely in 1950s that the compulsury single currency would be used to lift a political union in full scale in place. It was the form, not content, that counted, we can note.
If for example one of the Maastricht convergence requirements for example dealing public debt, which must not exceed 60% of GDP, effectively has validity, the consequence would be that the half to two thirds of countries would not meet this requirement by without accepting stabilization crises with IMF’s intervention. This can be extracted from the real information, which escapes from time to time.
Under Mercantilism, which historically ended with the Napoleonic wars, very simple methods were used to acquire wealth. Today it is so conceived that economic stability and development are measured by a price index a debt ratio by a exchange rate or at a different ratio. I.e. when, for example, some quantitative standards are met, so this is a stable currency, stable economy and stable development are secured (with reference to the five completely arbitrary convergence criteria originally included in the Maastricht Treaty). Economcs stability and development include the dynamics of the capital formation, security of the investment process, knowledge and competences acquisition, new technology and high productivity and economic real economic growth in a country, to its leaders can be said to take voters seriously. All this can not be obtained or estimated based on some static concept, a key figure or five for that matter.
France and most other countries was originally opposed to the so-called stability pact that could have ensured that central bank acted as the old German Bundesbank and held the reins completely tight, but from a different starting point than that of today. It was decided at the Dublin Summit in December 1998 to drop Stability Pact and in the years 2002 and 2003 France came out with too large deficits of public finances in relation to the Maastricht rules and Germany just as for the past more than five years.
The battle for who should appoint the president of the ECB was decided in Dublin. It was France. The German Bundesbank was very out of pace with the German political, financial and industrial elite. In contrast, the bank was very popular in the German public opinion. Therefore, the politician former Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl was very hard pressed between the German and French political Establishment. The French Socialists have built their requirements for euro in the subsequent treaties. Now with Kohl completely gone and the current German Chancellor (in 2011) is even a Centralist. EU has in turn recommended a German as head of IMF (International Monetary Fund). Kohl also had to eat that there could be purely automatic sanctions against a country that has sustained losses.
Now is required (after Amsterdam) 2 / 3 of the weighted votes of the active participating EMU countries to make sanctions when it goes wrong in a country. France had also approved a so-called Stability Council and thus a direct political role led into the monetary policy by that example formulated exchangerate-guidelines for the euro now. It’s quite crazy. France has secured the former French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde as managing director in IMF. If this indicates that France now exert its influence equally in the ECB and in the IMF (President Jean Claude Trichet), it certainly was perhaps an idea to have a check of the French economy. It looks like more inflation have to be expected in the future, but we can say with this any absolute certainty.
Introduction of the pure (economic) stability pact without countries in order their real economies, leads expectedly to real political instability. And can money quantity is not discussed over the entire euro zone, because it must be determined by a tough ECB, then the consequences for certain areas immediately be so insanely hard, that there is political instability. Not only Italy, Spain and Greece are examples where the way has been shown. This is not a proposal for flexible euro money, but a demonstration of the euro’s impossible integration in the EU.
To relieve the pressure, you can introduce that the more strong-going countries must “deliver some means from their public finances or even commit to this in advance”. But the problem is that nobody can or will or should do so to the less well-country, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Poland, and that is exactly what the recent confirmation of the Stability and Growth Pact prescribes. This tightening political steering instruments, and the citizens of individual countries and thereby their politicians cannot agree to this. The next step may in consequence be the function of taxation to be transferred to the EU. This means initially in plain Danish that public expenditures should be managed crown for crown throughout the euro zone from the EU. This is common fiscal policy. Under this assumption the very little extravagant actions must quickly be closed in for, but also many others.
When you were judging by the declining DM and the increasing Italian lire in 1997-1998 market might get the impression that there was talk about a soft manageable euro at its establishment. There was simply unknown, but colossal Italian lire-volume should have ‘a forever defined’ euro exchange rate in July 1998 (so they said). How could this be possible? Since the exchange rate for Euro was reported to public in advance, speculators began to speculate of cource, especially when national currencies drove on for some time.
Already in 1996 one could foresee the consequences if Germany, France and England would take over Italy’s huge debt mountain at a time – it has happened apparently, we wrote back then, but could not know because we did not know debt figures. It would simple has destroyed the euro from the beginning and led ECB to also take care to guarantee the solvency from then onwards for both Italy, Spain, Portugal and Belgium and all the other violent debt burdened participating countries such as Greece, and what else could to be expected to introduced as EU-members in Eastern Europe in general. Therefore it happens now.
With the many new deficit countries inside, there would also be created an alliance with Amsterdam Treaty voting weights, which could put pressure on the ECB and get it to act as though it still has control over the monetary policy without it really does. Reel EMU severity by the book multiplied by three or four is what should be expected now if it is to succeed in creating economic stability in the current situation – without a strong leverage from outside.
Thus loosing the political stability is status quo and it is likely to be, and disappointment of the project will then lead to resistance to the whole euro project. Therefore they still act ‘as if’. The fear of competition inhibits rationality: globalization trivializing means the unrestricted movement of markets, including capital market. This globalization many argue destroy the democratic welfare state and the nation state. It does so only because we have no longer an international monetary system to prevent it. Free movement of capital undermines the ability of states to regulate. Especially in terms of employment. Wage pressure and cuts may intercept what threatens to be lost of jobs, particularly by outsourcing. Global financial markets are not subject to any self-regulatory competition mechanism, and induces crisis to crisis – Asia, Mexico, Russia and country in Latin America – if there is no order in the real economy. Crises will deepen because of the many debt securities, which amplify the difference between the nominal and real values of the nations. And all because you have chosen to supply the measuring tape instead of using the measuring tape to measure.
It gets worse when all the state leaders continue net borrowing more and more. Crises sharpen the social pressure with needed for cuts. The pressure leads either to dissolve the democratic welfare states, to dissolve itself into interconnected defense the blocks (blocks as the currency Euro, Dollar, Yen and Renminbi-zones) or fall back in the old enemy images that characterized the nation in advance or in a combination of both scenarios. With the dissolution of the democratically founded national and social state globalization triggers itself eventually, because it can not stand for their countries’ populations/voters have to carry larger and heavier loads without any security for himself to be covered against the worst.
Euro-Union is the prototype of this development. Its thinly disguised double-motive was a) fear of dollar dominance and competition, and b) fear of the new reunified Germany with the D-Mark-regime.
Anxiety are always based on a false analysis. Non U.S. dollar threatens Europe’s market shares in world trade, but Europe’s lost knowledge-, competence- and technical-terrains and especially Europe’s inertia with reforms and innovations are concerned. Not Deutschmark hardness and strength prevented the development and integration, but from the “Maastricht” the goal was abolition of the Deutschmark, and it has happened. The rationale was that just the Deutschmark should have driven the current euro-participating countries then into a string negative developments aimed at reforms and social limitations. Alone these fallacies and incorrect assumptions permits no realistic expectations a hard euro. Inflation is preprogrammed. Then blow more air in and let it float in the oil first, but the collapse thereby becomes even greater. All participants member-states are deeply indebted and running all at a loss. Already at the euro start the national governments were loosing their management instruments (exchange rates, interest rates, money amount and flexible budget) to ensure monetary values and regulation of labor and the social- and ecological standards which the same politicians had introduced.
Structural and competitive differences will without elasticity from the state be offset by the market. There must be real exchange rates, but definitely not in the euro-design, i.e. with a compulsory common currency, be course it can’t bear the structural differences that characterizes Europe simultaneously.
The main battle is now the labor market, social and ecosystems. The labor market suffers from the middle class is reduced, salary and social competition from workers in the southern EU-poverty zones, and there is an inevitable liquidation of the previously existing (national) unions’ rates and the minimum standards for the social level. The market is sweeping them away, employers rely increasingly on their threat potential in moving production to very favorable (salary, social, tax, eco-cheap) EU-zones and even to Asia. Wage rates, social standards and environmental requirements in Euroland will have to harmonize downwards. Social Democrats, Folksocialists and the trade unions claimed them, but also other people’s naive belief that these things finally could be improved by a signature on the Maastricht treaty. In Euro-Union labor and social policy finally wave goodby – and it happens in full connection to/acceptance of Social Democracy, Folk Socialists, the trade unions and others believers.
March 2007: http://danmark.wordpress.com/2006/05/25/euro-float-in-oil/
Union is suitable as it looks only into submission – Islam means submission
Euro-Union is not a mean towards globalization triggering the employment crisis. There is nothing special about the nature of this ‘globalization’, it newspeake; international competition is the right word. Euro-Union reinforces the power of capital and state powerlessness in the role that could do something about unemployment without having the necessary tools. It is “progress”towards the 19 century (here, an attempt was also the right management tool), not towards the 21 century.
Euro-Union is no counterbalance to the antisocial tendencies of globalization, as incompetent analysts from the left side view, it enhances them further. It obliges to adapt working life to the money economy that take commands. The European Central Bank (ECB) may lead full common-policy for at first 12 since 15 and 16 differently structured countries in the euro zone, without they can take back to the exchange rate as equalization valve. In order to prevent capital from leaving the euro zone, the central bank raise interest rates or simply centralist prohibit the export of capital (as in the Soviet), but this reduces activity and increases unemployment even more. Such a union can only end the states themselves in conflict from which no help is to find – unless it gets extended to a transfer union or a federal state with public financial equalization between the old and new participating countries, something like patchwork U.S. or the German Federal republic, but without the Deutschmark.
Once the transfer of these models in the Euro-Union proves impossible or meets much resistance the question arises: Are there plausible alternative models that can save the peace? As it is now running: Europe and the Arab world has already begun to work together economically in a de facto alliance that it was pre peeped in North-South Dialogue from 1968 and the European-Arab dialogue from mid 1970s. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia decided in 2006 to setting up free trade zone, and Algiers, Lebanon, Mauritania, the Palestinian Authority and Syria were invited to participate in the great free trade zone.
Egypt may be on to becoming an Islamist state, expected to be fully occupied in free trade group. However, the EU has negotiated with all 10 Maghreb countries, part of the so-called Barcelona Process about the cooperation between the EU and its neighbors around the Mediterranean to the south.
The ultimate goal of this Barcelona Process is to establish closer ties by-touching trade and social issues (immigration!) as well as political (islam!). This must after the politician-proclaimed lead to the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade The zone of 27 countries. It is possible that European productions in the future must take place in North Africa, Middle East and Eastern Europe, until they have come up, and we have come way down. It is a matter of people here find themselves in it.
February 4 2010: Pressure er mounting across the Atlantic as Greece, Portugal and a handful of struggling countries that use the euro have to two pay-off mountains of debt accumulated from years of profligate spending.
February 13 2010: Axel Weber, president of Germany’s Bundesbank, warned that German economy will contract this year (2010). It did with 1,7%, after 2009 with -5,2%.
The latest: Spain’s Unemployment rate reached 20% in the first quarter (of 2010), doubles the euro zone’s March average. Euro-zone inflation, mean while, rose to the highest rate since December 2008. The official Unemployment Rate!
1) “Ever since the continents started interacting politically well 500 years ago, Eurasia has been the world power center “(opening book” The Great chessboard ” 1997, by Zbigniew Brzezinski). Eurasia is all land east of Germany and Poland, the stretches all the way through Russia and China to the Pacific. It includes Middle East and most of the Indian subcontinent. The key to control Eurasia, says Brzezinski, is control over the Central Asian republics. And key to control over the Central Asian republics is Uzbekistan.
He also notes clearly (p. 53) that “any nation that had become dominant in Central Asia would directly threaten the ongoing U.S. control of oil-resources in the Persian Gulf.” By reading the book it becomes clear why the U.S. had a motive to take over the $ 300 billion Russian assets in 1990-ies, destabilize Russian currency (1998) and to ensure a weakened Russia would have to turn to the west, to Europe in order to survive economically and politically, instead to look south to Central Asia. A dependent Russia would lack the military, economic and political influence to penetrate and influence in the region and the weakening of Russia may explain why Russian President Vladimir Putin has been a willing ally of U.S. efforts to date.
M. Sc. (Economics) Joern E. Vig, 14 August 2011
Mark Steyn on “After America,” London Riots and Keynesian Culture: Scribecast, the
Podcast of the Center for Media and Public Policy
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